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We study the effect of relationship lending on small firms´ failure probability using 
a uniquely rich data set comprised of information on individual loans of a large 
number of small firms in Colombia. We control for firm-specific variables and find 
that small firms involved in long-term liaisons with commercial banks have a 
significantly lower probability of becoming bankrupt than otherwise identical firms 
not involved in a long-term credit relationship. We also find that small firms with 
multiple banking relationships face a lower failure hazard than otherwise identical 
firms involved in a unique long-term relationship.   
JEL Classification: G20; G21; C40. 
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1.  Introduction 
Financial institutions are a key source of external funding for firms. In the US, 
borrowing from financial institutions accounts for about 25% of the stock of external 
finance of the productive sector (Mishkin, 2009) and for almost all the stock of external 
finance of small businesses (Bodenhorn, 2003). Moreover, as Hawkins (2002) points 
out, the financial system in emerging economies is centered on banks. For example, the 
ratio of domestic bank lending to the sum of domestic bank lending and private sector 
domestic debt securities on issue is around 0.8 for Latin American and East Asian 
economies. Thus, for small businesses in developed countries and for most firms in 
developing economies, banks loom large. 
Bank relationships have long been valued in financial economics theory. In a world in 
which informational asymmetries exist and matter, banks gather valuable information 
on firms´ creditworthiness through repeated lending. The establishment of long-term 
relationships allows banks to identify solvent firms and provide them with funding, 
reducing credit risk. Firms that form relationships with banks obtain several advantages, 
such as lower interest costs, lower collateral demands, and protection against credit 
rationing during times of financial distress. Therefore, both banks and firms seeking to 
finance profitable projects benefit from repeated contracting. 
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Financiera de Colombia. E-mail: nrreyes@superfinanciera.gov.co The evidence indicates that relationships are favorable to firms in the sense that they 
increase funds availability and reduce loan rates (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). There 
is also evidence indicating that the establishment of banking relationships may be more 
important for small firms which are typically more bank dependent than large firms 
(Fazzari et al, 1988; Dietsch, 2003; Guiso, 2003; Gómez-González and Reyes, 2010).  
However, while there is consensus in the literature about the importance of credit 
relationships, surprisingly there is no study on the effects of bank-firm liaisons on small 
firms´ failure probability.  
This study uses a uniquely rich data set comprised of information on individual loans of 
a large number of small firms in Colombia, and contributes to the literature in two 
important ways. First, it provides evidence that the establishment of one or more long-
term relationships with banks reduces significantly the probability of default of small 
businesses. This is the first study in providing such evidence. And second, it shows that 
unlike large firms in which the number of banking relationships does not affect the 
probability of failure, the choice between unique and multiple relationships significantly 
affects the hazards of bankruptcy. 
Section 2 is a literature review section. Section 3 makes a description of the data used in 
the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical model and estimation results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
  
2.  Literature review 
The existence of asymmetric information in financial markets makes bank lending 
unique. Various theoretical studies claim that financial intermediaries have a 
comparative advantage in the production of information about borrowers that leads to 
efficiency gains in the borrowing-lending process (e.g., Boyd and Prescott, 1986; 
Diamond, 1991). The establishment of client relationships may produce an important 
flow of information that facilitates the building of a bank-specific informational capital 
that mitigates informational problems in credit markets. Fama (1985) claims that these 
endogenous long-term relationships affect the ability firms have to raise capital. In 
particular, firms involved in a long-term relationship with a bank have a higher 
probability of raising the required funds to finance an investment opportunity than 
otherwise identical firms not involved in these kinds of relationships4.  
Empirical studies have shown that relationship banking has a significant effect on the 
availability and quantity of credit, particularly for small businesses. To mention just a 
few examples, Petersen and Rajan (1994) use the 1987 National Survey of Small 
Business Finance and find that small firms increase their financing ability when they 
establish a long-term relationship with a bank. Berger and Udell (1996) arrive to the 
same conclusion using data from Federal Reserve’s Survey of the Terms of Bank 
Lending to Business. Ely and Robinson (2007), using data from the Small Business 
Administration, report similar findings. Additionally, Boot and Thakor (1994) show that 
                                                            
4 In a world in which firms´ repaying capacity in the future is not directly observable, the firm that obtains 
a new loan sends a signal to the market that its projects are worth of being financed, increasing its 
probability of raising the required funds. A firm that has a well established relationship with a bank has a 
better chance to obtain a new loan, and therefore the lender-borrower relationship can affect firms´ ability 
of raising capital. interest rates charged by banks to firms and collateral requirements decrease as the 
relationship matures. 
Banks find it also convenient to establish credit relationships with firms, because their 
cost of maintaining long-term relationships is normally lower than the cost of repeated 
direct monitoring (Haubrich, 1989). The process of repeated contracting can produce 
valuable input for the lender in making decisions on loan issuing, loan pricing, and 
collateral requirements. 
 
While there seems to be a consensus on the importance of the establishment of long-
term relationships between banks and non-financial firms, the optimal number of such 
relationships has been a subject of debate. Diamond (1984) shows that in a one-shot 
game each firm optimally chooses a unique banking relation. However, in a repeated 
lending setting the results are mixed. Some studies argue in favor of a unique long-term 
relation (Haubrich, 1989; Sharpe, 1990) while others argue in favor of multiple relations 
(Rajan, 1992; Detragiache et Al. (2000); Von Thadden, 2004).  
In the real world, unique long-term bank relations and multiple bank relations coexist 
(Degryse et Al., 2009). Some recent studies have shown firm heterogeneity can explain 
this empirical regularity. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) build a model in which the 
optimal number of banking relations depends on individual firm characteristics, such as 
technology, credit rating, and the industry to which the firm belongs. Bris and Welch 
(2005) show that if borrower quality is not known, the best firms choose to have a lower 
number of creditors to signal themselves as robust firms. Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes 
(2004), assume that revealing information can be costly for firms, and show that highly 
competitive and innovative firms tend to sustain a lower number of banking relations. 
Using similar arguments, Yosha (1995), and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) obtain the 
same result.  
There are no theoretical studies in which the firm´s size matters for the optimal number 
of relationships. However, papers that have studied the microeconomic determinants of 
the optimal number of banking relationships using data from different countries have 
shown that small firms tend to maintain fewer bank relationships than large firms 
(Ongena and Smith, 2000; Dietsch, 2003; Guiso, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007; 
Gómez-González and Reyes, 2010). This empirical regularity may obey to the fact that 
while all types of banks lend to large firms, normally only small banks extend credit to 
small businesses (Berger et al, 1995; Peek and Rosengren, 1996; Strahan and Weston, 
1998). 
Two questions that have not been addressed in the literature appear: i) do banking 
relationships matter for small businesses survival?; and, ii) does the probability of 
surviving depend on the number of relationships? This study answers these two 
important questions. We work on two hypotheses: 
H1: The establishment of at least one long-term banking relationship increases the 
probability of surviving for a small firm. H2: Moreover, firms involved in multiple relationships have a lower hazard of failing 
than otherwise identical firms involved in unique long-term relationships. 
The intuition behind H1 is simple. On the one hand, in contrast to the “financial 
irrelevance theorem” of Modigliani and Miller (1958), which claims that the firm´s 
value is independent of its capital structure, the related empirical literature has shown 
that the value of the firm depends on its ability to raise external funds (see, for instance, 
Makhija and Spiro, 2005; Maher et al, 2008; Chan et al, 2009, among others). On the 
other hand, it has long been recognized in the literature that the probability of failure of 
a firm depends heavily on the value of the firm (for a literature review see De Giuli et 
al, 2008). Therefore, the probability a firm fails depends on its ability to raise funds. 
Fazzari et al (1988) show a financial hierarchy exists and depends on firm-specific 
characteristics. They also show that, unlike large firms which are able to raise funds in 
capital markets, small firms are bank-dependent. It is to expect, then, that small firms´ 
survival depends on their capacity to establish long-term credit relations with 
commercial banks.  
Regarding H2, Detragiache et Al. (2000) claim that relationship banks may be unable to 
continue funding projects due to internal problems, and firms holding a unique 
relationship with one of such banks may have to refinance with another bank. However, 
the latter does not know the quality of the project and may refuse to lend or charge high 
informational costs to the firm. In that scenario, the establishment of multiple banking 
relations can reduce the probability of an undesirable liquidation of the project. It is 
sensible to expect, then, that small firms with multiple relationship creditors have a 
higher probability of surviving than similar firms with only one committed credit 
provider. 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 are formally tested in this study. 
 
3.  Description of the data 
This study includes both microeconomic and macroeconomic covariates in order to 
explain the probability of failure of small businesses. Microeconomic information is 
collected from two different data sets. On the one hand, we use data reported by 
commercial banks to the Financial Superintendence of Colombia
5 in the Format 341. 
This data, which is collected in a quarterly basis, contains specific information about 
each loan, including identification of its holder, amount of the loan, ex-ante interest rate, 
type of guarantee, and credit rating of the debtor. We use data on the number of banking 
relationships from December 1999 to December 2007. 
On the other hand, this study uses use data on non-financial firms´ balance sheets 
reported to the Corporations Superintendence of Colombia
6. With this information we 
calculate firm-specific financial ratios used as covariates in the empirical models 
                                                            
5 The Financial Superintendence of Colombia is the regulator of Colombia´s financial sector. 
6 The Corporations Superintendence is the Firm’s / Corporation’s Supervisory Agency in Colombia. estimated in this paper. We use data from December 1995 to December 2007. The two 
microeconomic data bases are matched using the firms´ identification code
7. 
Macroeconomic information is collected from the National Department of Statistics of 
Colombia. 
Our interest relies on the failure of small businesses. Therefore, two decisions regarding 
firm classification were required. First, we had to decide which definition of “failure” 
we were to follow. Second, we had to decide how to classify firms according to their 
size. 
The definition of “failure” has been subject of debate. In this study we follow the most 
accepted view, consisting of a juridical definition in which failure is equivalent to 
bankruptcy
8 (see Charitou et al, 2004).  
Regarding size, firms were placed into three size groups based on asset size
9. For the 
allocation of firms into these groups we followed the criterion established by the Law 
905 of 2004, which considers small firms as those with total assets´ value is less than 
5,000 minimum monthly Colombian wages. Medium-size firms are those with total 
assets´ value ranging between 5,001 and 30,000 minimum monthly Colombian wages. 
Large firms are those with total assets valued over 30,000 minimum monthly 
Colombian.  
Table 1. Distribution of firms according to their size 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of firms in the sample according to their size. 
Noteworthy, the proportion of small firms in the sample grew importantly, especially 
                                                            
7 In Colombia, the firms´ i.d. code is known as the “NIT”. 
8 The juridical definition of failure is arguably the most adequate because it provides an objective 
criterion that allows firms to be separated easily into two distinct populations. 
9 Firm size could have been alternately measured as market value, sales or number of employees. 
Small Medium Large
1995 822 5472 2990 9284 8,85%
1996 947 5219 2993 9159 10,34%
1997 1271 5260 3071 9602 13,24%
1998 1391 5043 2956 9390 14,81%
1999 2024 4863 2868 9755 20,75%
2000 2787 5176 2814 10777 25,86%
2001 2513 4833 2780 10126 24,82%
2002 2423 4496 2575 9494 25,52%
2003 2392 4439 2626 9457 25,29%
2004 3153 4421 2531 10105 31,20%
2005 10859 5987 2882 19728 55,04%
2006 12278 8108 3236 23622 51,98%




Small Firms in the 
Samplefrom 1999 on. An important number of small firms that reported information to the 
Corporations Superintendence between 2000 and 2007 had not done so before. 
Therefore, the data set we use in this study exhibits left (and also right) censoring. In 
order to deal efficiently with this peculiarity we use survival analysis techniques in the 
empirical analysis of this study. 
Following previous studies (e.g., Shumway, 2001; Gómez-González and Hinojosa, 
2010) and theoretical expectations, the following financial ratios were considered in the 
explanation of time to failure (Table 2): 
Table 2. Description of firm-specific covariates included in the empirical model 
Variable Description 
Liquidity (LIQ)  (Current assets + long-term investments) / (Current liabilities + long-term debt) 
Leverage (LEV)  Total liabilities / Equity 
Profitability (PROF)  ROA 
Inefficiency (INEFF)  Operational costs / Total assets 
Debt composition 
(COMP) 
Short-term liabilities / Total liabilities 
Relationships dummy 
(RELDUM) 
Indicator function taking the value 1 if the firm has at least one banking relationship and 
0 otherwise 
Number of relationships 
(NUMREL) 
Number of banking relationships held by the firm 
 
Two macroeconomic variables were also included: the annualized quarterly growth rate 
of real GDP (GROWTH) and the average real interest rate on loans (INT). These two 
variables were used to account for factors related to the business cycle that may excerpt 
influence on the business failure process. 
Pair-wise correlations of the included covariates were small and in no case they 
exceeded 0.42 in absolute value. 
More than 40% of the firms included in the sample belong to the industrial sector. The 
commercial sector is the second most representative of the sample (roughly 30% of the 







 Figure 1. Empirical distribution of firms according to economic sector 
 
In this study we are particularly interested in the effect of relationship lending on the 
probability of failure of small firms. Relationship lending is defined as a long-term 
implicit contract between a bank and its debtor. We follow the empirical literature on 
relationship lending and use the duration of the bank-borrower relationship as a proxy 
for relationship lending (see, for instance, Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 
1995; Ongena and Smith, 2001). We consider this an appropriate proxy, because 
duration reflects the degree of relationship intensity over time. Figure 2 shows a 
histogram of the number of relationships for the period 1995-2007. 
Figure 2. Histogram of the variable “number of banking relationships”, 1995-2007 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the density concentrates in a small number of relationships. The 
empirical probability of having at most two relationships is around 65%. In this sense, 
firms in Colombia behave similar to firms in the United Kingdom, Norway, and 
Sweden, which maintain fewer than three relationships on average, while contrast with 
firms in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which maintain on average ten or more bank 
relationships (Degryse et Al., 2009). 
There is cross-sectional difference in the number of relationships. Smaller firms exhibit 
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8at least one but no more than three relationships is lower for the former than for the 
latter (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Histogram of the variable “number of banking relationships” for small firms 
 
 
Other interesting regularity is that the empirical probability of having more than one but 
less than three relationships is lower during economic expansions than during economic 
contractions. This fact provides evidence that the number of bank relationships vary 
during the business cycle (Gómez-González and Reyes, 2010). 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the firms included in our sample. We have a 
total of 162,242 observations corresponding to 33,576 firms for the sample period. Out 
of these firms, 3,597 became bankrupt at some point between December 1995 and 
December 2007. Thus, the overall percentage of failures is 10.7%. The number of 
periods in risk corresponds to the number of quarters it takes a firm to fail after 
appearing for first time in the dataset. This time does not correspond necessarily to time 
to failure, because the data presents right censoring due to, for example, mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
Category Total  Mean  Minimum Median  Maximum 
Time at risk (quarters)  -  19.328 4  12  52 
Failures 3,597  0.107  0 0 1 
 
 
4. Empirical model and estimation results 
We use a hazard function model to study the time to failure of non-financial firms in 
Colombia. This approach generalizes the more common binary response approach by 
modeling not only the occurrence of the event but also the time it takes an individual to 
change of state (allowing a more efficient use of the available information). Hazard 
function models applied to this problem can provide answers to questions that are 
relevant for both supervisors and firm managers, such as: after the occurrence of a 
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8has survived up to that moment? Or, what is the predicted time to failure for a firm of 
some given characteristics? In the context of this paper, using the hazard function model 
we are able to test empirically hypotheses H1 and H2 presented above.  
Preliminary analysis on the raw data (data not conditioned on covariates) showed that 
the survival functions of firms belonging to different economic sectors are statistically 
identical. Therefore, we do not differentiate firms according to their economic sector. 
Similar tests showed, however, that small firms have a different survival function that 
the rest of the firms (Table 4). Therefore, we estimated separate hazard functions for 
small firms and for medium and large firms
10. Figure 4 shows the hazard function of 
failure of small firms
11. This function is clearly non-monotonic, showing that the most 
commonly used parametric models for the distribution of duration do not seem to be 
appropriate for modeling the baseline hazard considered in this study
12. Therefore, this 
paper estimates a proportional hazards model in which no parametric form is assumed 
for the baseline hazard function, following Cox (1972). As shown below using a 
specification test, this assumption seems to be appropriate for the problem of interest.  
Table 4. Tests for the equality of the survivor functions 
Null-hypothesis: Small firms and medium and large firms have identical survivor 
functions 
Test for failure 
Test Log-rank Cox Wilcoxon 
   (1 d.f.)  7.02  7.03  7.12 
Prob>    0.0081 0.0080 0.0076 
 
Figure 4. Estimated smoothed hazard function – failures of small firms 
 
                                                            
10 Firms of medium and large sizes have statistically identical survivor functions according to different 
tests. Thus, both groups were pooled into a unique group of firms. 
11 Hazard functions are estimated here as a kernel smoothed difference of the Aalen-Hansen estimator of 
the cumulative hazard functions. We use an asymmetric Epanechnikov kernel function. 
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Smoothed hazard estimateUnder the proportional hazards specification the hazard rate takes the following 
multiplicative form (see, for example, Gómez-González and Hinojosa, 2010) 
   , , ,            ,               (1) 
The baseline hazard function,      , captures the direct effect of time on the hazard rate. 
We specify       ,               ´  , where X(t) is a vector of time-varying 
covariates and   is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Under this specification, 
the coefficients can be given a partial derivative interpretation (Kiefer, 1988). In other 
words, each coefficient represents the constant, proportional effect of the corresponding 
covariate on the conditional probability of ending a spell. 
We estimated the corresponding proportional hazards model using the partial maximum 
likelihood method proposed by Cox (1972)
13. Ties in duration are handled by applying 
the method of Efron (1977)
14. Two different models were estimated. Specification 1 
incorporates both macroeconomic covariates and all microeconomic covariates except 
NUMREL. Specification 2 incorporates the two macroeconomic variables and all 
microeconomic covariates except RELDUM. Estimation results are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Estimation results for duration to failure (Proportional hazards specification) + 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 


































































Log-likelihood  -135466.7  -15323.5 -79045.2 -16457.1 
LR    (8 d.f.)  9429.5 1315.0 6282.7 1848.1 
Prob>    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
+Standard errors in parenthesis. ++Degrees of freedom in parenthesis. 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
                                                            
13 The parametric models, estimated for comparison purposes, are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
14 Hertz-Picciotto and Rockhill (1997) show that the Efron method for handling ties is to be the preferred, 
especially when the sample size is small either due to heavy censoring or from the outset.  
Both specifications are globally significant for the two groups of firms. The results 
show that both firm-specific and business cycle variables are important determinants of 
time to failure of non-financial firms. For all firms, profitability, inefficiency, and the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of real GDP appear to be significant explanatory 
variables of the failure process. A one percentage point increase in profitability leads to 
a reduction in a firm´s probability of failure of around 4 percent. A one percentage point 
increase in inefficiency leads to a reduction in a firm´s probability of failure of around 
0.3 percent. And a one percentage point increase in the annual growth rate leads to a 
reduction in a firm´s probability of failure of around 1 percent. 
Two other covariates are important explaining the failure process for small businesses 
but not for medium and large firms. A one percentage point increase in the ratio of 
short-term debt to total debt increases in 0.2 percent the hazard of failure of a small 
firm, but has no effect on the probability of failure of a medium or large firm. 
Our more interesting result relates to the effect of relationship lending on the hazard of 
failure of firms of different size. According to the results of Specification 1, all else 
constant, a small firm without a partner bank will reduce in almost 7 percent its hazard 
rate of failure if it establishes a long-term relationship with a financial institution. In 
contrast, the effect of relationship lending on the hazard rate of failure of a large firm is 
much modest and less significant. 
According to the results of Specification 2, an increase in the number of banking 
relationships benefits small firms while has no effect on larger firms. A small firm gains 
a reduction of 1.7 percent in its hazard rate of failure when increasing by one its number 
of relations. This effect is zero for a larger firm.   
Altogether, the results show that relationship lending has an effect on firms´ probability 
of failure. However, the effect is not homogeneous across firms of different sizes. The 
effect is much stronger and significant for small firms, which are more affected by the 
existence of asymmetric information in credit markets. 
Table 6 presents evidence that the proportional hazards assumption is adequate for our 
sample. The proportional hazards factorization implies that the effect of the covariates 
on the hazard function is constant over time. This hypothesis can be tested using the 
Schoenfeld´s residual test, which tests for a zero slope in a generalized linear regression 
of the residuals on time. The null hypothesis of the test is that the slope is zero. A 




 Table 6: Schoenfeld´s residuals test results – small firms 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
Covariate         Pr>  
 
       Pr>   
LIQ  0.248  1.77 0.1837  -0.177 1.41 0.2351 
LEV  0.093  0.28 0.5995  -0.136 0.70 0.4045 
PROF 0.019  0.01 0.9360  0.195  1.69 0.1932 
INEFF 0.323  2.14 0.1434  0.112  0.55 0.4569 
COMP  0.180  0.84 0.3582  0.089  0.35 0.5552 
RELDUM 0.321  0.83  0.3623       
NUMREL      0.045  0.12  0.729 
GROWTH  0.044 0.12 0.728  0.091 0.29 0.590 
INT  0.123  0.78 0.3771  0.312  2.32 0.1277 
Global  test   9.87 0.2743    9.49 0.3027 
 
Note that the null hypothesis of a zero slope cannot be rejected in any case. Therefore, 
the Schoenfeld´s residuals test provides evidence that the proportional hazards 
specification is adequate in this study. 
5.  Conclusions 
We study the effect of relationship lending on small firms´ failure probability using a 
uniquely rich data set comprised of information on individual loans of a large number of 
small firms in Colombia. We control for firm-specific variables and find that small 
firms involved in long-term liaisons with commercial banks have a significantly lower 
probability of becoming bankrupt than otherwise identical firms not involved in a long-
term credit relationship. We also find that small firms with multiple banking 
relationships face a lower failure hazard than otherwise identical firms involved in a 
unique long-term relationship. We thus find evidence that supports the validity of our 
working hypothesis H1 and H2. 
We also show that while long-term relationships are beneficial for firms of all sizes, 
these are significantly more important for small businesses. These results are 
complementary to those of other studies that suggest that the establishment of banking 
relationships may be more important for small firms which are typically more bank 
dependent than large firms (Fazzari et al, 1988; Dietsch, 2003; Guiso, 2003; Gómez-
González and Reyes, 2010). However, this study is the first to show that small firms 
with long-term credit relationships with financial institutions are less prone to fail than 
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